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Résumé 
Le réseau des Caisses d’épargne et de crédit agricole mutuels de Madagascar (CECAM) 
propose à ses sociétaires un produit innovant de crédit stockage pour le riz depuis 1993. La 
communication part du constat que le crédit stockage est un produit hybride, qui combine des 
flux et des stocks en numéraire et en nature, qui présente à la fois des caractéristiques de 
crédit et d’épargne, et qui s’articule étroitement avec les dynamiques du marché du riz local. 
Elle s’intéresse aux conditions d’accès et d’utilisation du crédit stockage par différentes 
catégories de ménages sociétaires, et à la façon dont ce produit s’insère dans les stratégies de 
ces ménages. La communication respose sur une analyse de données quantitatives et 
qualitatives collectées par les auteurs à l’occasion d’une étude d’impact du réseau menée entre 
2003 et 2007. Les données suggèrent que le crédit stockage Cecam répond de manière 
globalement satisfaisante aux différents besoins des ménages pauvres et non pauvres : il leur 
permet d’abaisser le seuil d’accès au crédit, de mieux valoriser leur production de riz (que ce 
soit pour la vente ou l’autoconsommation), et de poursuivre différents types de stratégies 
(plutôt orientées vers la sécurisation alimentaire pour les ménages pauvres, plutôt associées à 
une logique entrepreneuriale et de diversification pour les ménages non pauvres). 
 
Mots-clés : microfinance rurale, crédit stockage, stratégies des ménages ruraux, Madagascar 
 
Abstract 
The Malagasy rural finance network CECAM has been offering an innovative individual rice 
inventory credit to its members since 1993. Starting from the acknowledgement that the 
inventory credit is a hybrid product, which involves a mix of in kind and in cash flows and 
stocks, a mix of credit and savings features, and linkages with the local rice market, the papers 
sets out to inquire how it is accessed, used, and inserted in the strategies of different wealth 
categories of Cecam members. The paper is based on an analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data that were collected in several phases during a 4 year impact study conducted 
by the authors from 2003 to 2007. Evidence suggests that the Cecam inventory credit is 
globally well suited to the differentiated needs of poor as well as nonpoor households, 
because it lowers the access thresholds, it enhances the value of their rice production (be it for 
consumption or sale) and it allows them to pursue different kinds of strategies (more food 
security oriented for the poor, more entrepreneurial and diversification oriented for the non 
poor). 
 
Keywords : rural microfinance, inventory credit, rural household strategies, Madagascar 
 From food security to economic diversification: 
heterogeneity  of rationales around a rice inventory credit 
in Madagascar1 
1. Introduction 
 
Rural finance and even more so agricultural finance still raise considerable challenges to 
policymakers and practitioners alike (Nagarajan and Meyer 2005, CGAP 2005). After the 
dismantling of public agricultural development banks in many developing countries, outreach 
levels have remained quite low. Microfinance institutions are faced with many difficulties 
expanding into the rural areas, one of which is the inadequacy of the traditional microfinance 
products, tailored for urban, commerce oriented clients, to the specific features of the demand 
of rural and agricultural households. In this gloomy panorama, the case of the “Caisses 
d’épargne et de crédit agricole mutuels de Madagascar” (CECAM) is particularly outstanding 
and offers a lot to learn from. 
 
The CECAM have been providing Malagasy rural households with a range of innovative 
financial products since 1993. Among those is a rice inventory credit product, called “Grenier 
commun villageois” (GCV), which in 2006 accounted for a third of the CECAM credit 
portfolio (Table 1). This individual credit product is fully collateralized by the debtor’s rice 
stock, which is held jointly by the local CECAM branch and the GCV users for the duration 
of the loan – six months on average. The loan amount is computed by multiplying the quantity 
of rice stored by a percentage factor (usually 75%) of the local rice price at the time of the 
harvest (Box 1). There is no specified purpose for the loan, although productive off-season 
activities (agricultural or non agricultural) are encouraged. Loan instalment and repayment 
take place respectively around the harvest period (june-july) and at the end of the year when 
local rice prices usually start to rise due to the lean season. 
 
The Cecam GCV credit thus combines two objectives. Aside from the short term credit, it 
allows the producer to store its harvest (or part of it) until the lean season, when local market 
prices are higher. After reimbursing his credit, the producer can either 1) self-consume his 
stock, which allows him not to buy food on the market at a high price and thus to economize 
over the year on its food expenses, or 2) sell his stock, thereby realizing a monetary gain 
through the price differential between harvest time and lean time. 
 
According to the Cecam leaders and managers, the GCV is intended to be particularly 
beneficial for poor households. Since the only collateral required is rice stock, and the 
minimum quantity required to file for a loan is set at a low level of 75 kg, it is easily 
accessible even to small-scale rice producers that cannot provide the traditional collateral 
required for the other loan products offered by the network (not to mention the formal 
banking system). Also, by allowing households not to sell their rice at harvest time when they 
may be in need for cash but the local price is low, and by postponing their use of the rice 
                                                 
1 The data presented in this paper were collected during an impact study contract funded by 
the European Development Fund in Madagascar and are the property of the Government of 
Madagascar. The analyses are drawn from partial results of the study and are the sole 
responsibility of the authors. 
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stock, thus allowing them to lower their purchases of rice for family consumption when the 
price is high, the GCV is expected to have some positive impact in terms of food security. 
However, because of its dual nature of financial and marketing service, the GCV can also be 
an attractive product for non poor households. 
 
Table 1 Cecam loan portfolio – main products 2006 
  Number of loan files Amount 
Average loan 
amount (€) 
Average length 
(months) 
Productive 52% 40% 180 8 
GCV 33% 34% 240 6 
Leasing 7% 16% 560 20 
Social 5% 1% 30 3 
Commercial  2% 6% 600 Na 
TOTAL 35 832 8.3 million € 230 - 
Source : Cecam MIS.  
 
Box 1 : The CECAM inventory credit GCV 
Interest rate : 3% per month, minimum 5 months (even if ahead reimbursement) 
Ceilings for approval procedure: 
 At the local branch : 5 tons of paddy 
 At the regional level : 20 millions Ariary (8000 €) 
 At the national level : no specified ceiling 
Length : 5 to 10 months for paddy 
Collateral : individual stock of rice 
Computing factor for the calculation of loan amount : 65% to 75% of the current local 
price for paddy 
Varying shares :  
5% of the loan amount for amounts up 2 millions Ariary (800 €) and 4% on the 
remaining amount 
Stock requirements :  
 Minimum number of borrowers per warehouse facility : 2. The storage is collective 
but each stock and credit is individually managed. For big storers (usually above 5T), 
individual storage can be tolerated. 
 Minimum volume of individual stock of paddy : 75 kg 
Warehouse requirements :  
 The building can be owned by one of the members or rented from someone else. In 
some regions, Cecam has had some collective warehouses build with financial support from 
the EU. 
 Solid materials for walls and roof 
 One entry/exit 
 2 locks (1 is kept by the Cecam credit officer, 1 by the representative of the storers) 
Instalments : 1 or more instalments upon decision of member (allows for staggered harvest 
and storage, or storage of a combination of produced and purchased rice) 
Payments : 1 or more payments upon decision of member. The payment must be made before 
the rice stock is given back (totally or partially depending on the amount repaid).  
Monitoring :  
 Regular controls of the warehouse situation by Cecam credit officers 
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 Opening of the warehouse and delivery of rice stocks back to their owners are made 
under the supervision of credit officers and warehouse borrowers representative 
 
The Cecam GCV stands out from the classical inventory credit in the sense that there is no 
third party involved in the storage. As a financial institution, Cecam also takes care of the 
storage monitoring, and the responsibility for the maintenance of the stock in good conditions 
falls upon the group of member storers. 
 
Source : CECAM 
 
 
The literature on inventory credit is still quite scarce. The main focus is on inventory credit as 
a way to regulate agricultural markets in a context of liberalization, with a discussion on the 
institutional conditions that are required for it to perform this function adequately. The main 
actors considered as involved with the inventory credit are producers organisations and 
individual agricultural traders rather than producers themselves (even though they are 
expected to indirectly benefit from the market regulation) (Coulter and Shepherd 2001, 
Coulter and Onumah 2002). Somewhat surprisingly, in its recent review of models for 
agricultural finance, the CGAP (2005) makes no mention of this kind of financial product. 
Onumah (2003) does focus on the implications in terms of rural finance, but mostly from the 
perspective of the financial institution. One advantage of the inventory credit is the lower 
level of default risk (as Table 2 also illustrates in the case of CECAM). In this paper, we take 
on a different approach. Since the GCV offered by Cecam is intended for individual members, 
who engage in rice production (and sometimes in small-scale rice marketing too), we focus on 
the perspective of these individual users and their households. 
 
Table 2 : prevalence of repayment delays by loan products  
 Rate of delay Total N 
GCV 7% 1020 
Social 15% 422 
Productive 18% 1263 
Leasing 30% 138 
Total 15% 2843 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey and Cecam MIS 
 
The paper is based on an analysis of quantitative and qualitative data that were collected in 
several phases during a 4 year impact study conducted by the authors from 2003 to 2007. 
Starting from the acknowledgement that the GCV is a hybrid product, which involves a mix 
of in kind and in cash flows and stocks, a mix of credit and savings features, and linkages 
with the local rice market, it sets out to inquire how it is accessed, used, and inserted in the 
strategies of different wealth categories of Cecam members.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 3 addresses 
the conditions of access of the GCV, and the product assessment by the members, across three 
wealth categories. Section 4 deals with price differentials and food security issues. Section 5 
provides qualitative insights into the diversity of rationales and processes of GCV 
management. Section 6 concludes with operational implications. 
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2. Methodology 
The data presented in this paper are drawn from a broader impact study of the Cecam network 
that was conducted by the authors between 2003 and 2007. The study relied on a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches, following some of the current trends in 
microfinance impact studies (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001, Hulme 2000, Sebstad and Cohen 
2000, Copestake et al 2005) and more generally in development studies (Kanbur and Shaffer 
2007)2. The central unit of analysis was the rural household (rather than the farm or the rural 
microenterprise), to account for the fact that productive strategies and trajectories take place 
within a portfolio of several agricultural and nonagricultural activities, and that they are 
nonseparable from broader livelihood strategies which are also related to the position of the 
household in the lifecycle.  
 
A three-year panel survey was set up with a stratified sample of 505 households (including 
Cecam members and non members). The first round was conducted in 2003 (N=505), 
followed by two subsequent rounds in 2006 (N=412) and 2007 (N=390)3. The questionnaire 
included several modules on household composition, income-generating activities, assets, 
financial practices (credit and savings, formal and informal), and a specific module for Cecam 
members (credit trajectories, relationship with Cecam, assessment of procedures and products, 
etc.). A multivariate factor analysis was applied to the 2003 data to classify the households 
into three wealth categories, which will be used all along the paper (basic descriptive statistics 
are provided in Table 3). The quantitative data provides information on the credit trajectories 
of 332 Cecam members, and specific information on 229 GCV credits that were taken by 
these members during the 2003-2007 period. 
 
Table 3 : Household wealth categories – panel survey 
 Total Non poor Medium Poor 
     
N obs. 505 124 173 208 
% total surveyed 100% 25% 34% 41% 
% Cecam members 100% 30% 41% 30% 
% non Cecam members 100% 15% 22% 63% 
Average monetary income (euros) 440 1160 400 120 
Average assets (equipment + livestock) (euros) 480 1120 400 200 
% households with exclusively agricultural income  39% 19% 39% 51% 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey 
 
The qualitative information used in this paper is taken from two rounds of in-depth 
interviews. The first one was conducted in 2003 on a subsample of 100 households (members 
and non members) from the panel survey. The interviews addressed the economic and credit 
trajectories of the households, and their underlying strategies and rationales. The second 
round was conducted in 2007 on a sample of 41 member households who had experienced the 
GCV. In-depth interviews focused specifically on the uptake and the management of the GCV 
within their credit trajectories with the CECAM. The 41 households were also classified into 
three wealth categories, based on a qualitative assessment that included housing conditions as 
well as the level and composition of assets and activities portfolio (10 households were 
classified as poor, 20 as medium and 11 as non poor). Detailed information was obtained on 
73 GCV contracts taken by these 41 households mostly in 2007 and some in the previous 
                                                 
2 For a discussion on the methodological aspects of the study, see Bouquet, Wampfler and 
Ralison (2009). 
3 The differences in sample size are due to attrition. 
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years. The duration of these interviews ranged from 2 to 3 hours. While the quantitative panel 
survey was applied by surveyors (under close supervision by one of the authors of the study), 
all the qualitative interviews were conducted directly by the authors themselves, one of which 
is Malagasy and has an extensive experience of fieldwork in Malagasy rural settings. This 
allows for a fair level of confidence in the global relevance and reliability of the collected 
data. 
3. The GCV is accessed and appreciated by all 
categories of households 
Access and use 
The GCV appears as a pillar of the credit trajectories of most Cecam members. It is present in 
80% of members credit trajectories. In 93% of the cases, it is combined with productive 
credit, which is generally used for rice cultivation. The GCV is complementary to the 
productive credit in the sense that it allows the member not to sell all his production at harvest 
time (at a low price) in order to repay the productive loan which has arrived at maturity. 
Indeed, Table 4 shows that in 22% of the cases, part of the GCV loan amount was used to 
repay another Cecam credit (usually a productive credit). As expected, the most frequent 
declared use of the GCV is linked to off-season productive activity, either agricultural or non 
agricultural. Note that almost a quarter of the GCV users also declared having used part of the 
loan to buy rice (more on this in section 4). 
 
Table 4 : use of GCV 2003-2007  
 N % 
Productive activity   
Agricultural 71 31% 
Non agricultural 95 41% 
Productive investment 17 7% 
Rice purchase  52 23% 
Reimbursement of another Cecam credit 50 22% 
Other 23 10% 
Total 308 134% 
N GCV 229 100% 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey. Total above 100% because multiple answers 
allowed. 
 
Table 5 displays the distribution of credit uptakes by the Cecam members since they joined 
the institution, according to their wealth categories. It shows that the access and use of the 
GCV is independent of the level of wealth (the KHI2 test for the GCV row is not significant). 
This suggests that although the GCV was intended to lower the credit access threshold for 
poor households with little material collateral, it is also attractive to non poor households, 
although it might be for different reasons. 
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Table 5 : distribution of credit uptakes by members since they joined Cecam, by wealth 
categories 
 Non poor Medium Poor Total N 
Productive 26% 45% 29% 100% 1537 
GCV 29% 43% 28% 100% 1096 
leasing 37% 40% 23% 100% 196 
Social 23% 46% 30% 100% 498 
Total credits 27% 44% 29% 100% 3327 
Total members 30% 41% 30% 100% 332 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey and Cecam MIS. Khi2 test non significant for the 
GCV 
 
While access to the GCV is evenly distributed across all wealth categories, the volumes stored 
(and thus the loan amounts) show a clear differentiation (Table 6). The average volume stored 
by non poor households is significantly higher than for the other two groups (2,6 Tons against 
1,8 and 1,5 respectively). The same holds true for the average volume produced per household 
per year. If we compare the mean volumes produced and stored across categories, it appears 
that poorer households are left with significantly less rice stock at home (for either sale or 
consumption) that non poor household (0,9 T versus 1,9T for the medium and 3T for the non 
poor). Although no straightforward conclusion can be drawn from this result alone, there 
might be some implications regarding the households food security (and more generally, 
economic resilience) during the storage period (see section 4 and 5). 
 
Table 6 : Rice production and volumes stored in the GCV, by wealth categories  
 Non poor Medium Poor Total 
Rice storage (T)     
N 51 93 72 216 
Average 2,6 1,8 1,5 1,9 
Std deviation 2,2 1,5 1,5 1,7 
Median 1,7 1,2 1,0 1,2 
Rice production (T)     
N 50 95 73 218 
Average 5,6 3,7 2,4 3,7 
Std deviation 7,1 2,5 1,3 4,0 
Median 3,4 3,1 2,2 2,9 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey 
 
Assessment 
The GCV appears as one of the best rated Cecam credit products: 63% of the GCV users 
declared that they are totally satisfied with the product (Table 7)4. In the quantitative survey, 
interviewees were also asked to give a score, on a 10 point scale, for each product they had 
experienced in their credit trajectories. For the GCV, 10% of the scores were under the 
average 5, 11% were set at the average, and 79% were above the average. 
 
                                                 
4 For a discussion on the other product assessments, see Bouquet, Wampfler, Ralison (2007, 
2009). 
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Table 7 : Satisfaction rate for the main credit products by credit users 2003-2007  
 
productiv
e gcv social leasing Total 
Totally satisfied 38% 63% 44% 62% 49% 
N 310 229 57 102 719 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey 
t for GCV users. This in turn can inform the rationales and strategies 
ehind the GCV uptake. 
npoor household, although for different reasons than 
e poor, as the qualitative data showed. 
ain issues mentioned with regards to the GCV by users non totally satisfied, 
2003-2007 
ccess to credit 
 
Quantitative data (Table 8) and qualitative discussions provide some additional insights into 
the issues that are relevan
b
 
Since the assessment criteria presented in Table 8 were those formulated by the respondents 
themselves for all the Cecam loan products5, the lines that get a low percentage of criticism 
can be interpreted as a sort of appraisal “by default”. The absence of material collateral (aside 
from the stock of rice), the easiness of the filing procedure, the flexibility in terms of amount, 
instalment and repayment schedules are highly appreciated. Interestingly, the easiness of 
access to the GCV was also valued by no
th
 
Table 8 : M
Issues linked with a  
Collateral too high 2% 
Varying share too high 20% 
Procedure too cumbersome 2% 
Fees to high 2% 
Amount lower than requested 0% 
Computing factor too low 14% 
Issues linked with credit leverage and reimbursement  
Delay in credit instalment 20% 
Interest rate too high 51% 
Reimbursement procedure inappropriate 6% 
Term too short 2% 
Other 16% 
Total 138% 
N answers 117 
N respondentsa 85 
a : number of answers higher than number of respondents due to multiple answers allowed. 
ource : Cecam impact study panel survey. 
                                                
 S
 
For the poor, what mattered was the fact that they did not have to struggle to provide 
collateral other than their own rice stock. For the wealthiest of the nonpoor, who are not 
usually not constrained in terms of the material collateral that they can provide, what mattered 
was the fact that with the GCV they could very quickly access amounts much higher than 
with the productive credit. According to the CECAM procedures, a request for a productive 
credit above 800 euros has to be transmitted by the local branch to the regional office before 
approval, which lengthens the delays. Also, filing for a productive credit requires that official 
 
5 The questionnaire featured an open question and the coding was done afterwards. 
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proofs are provided for collateral ownership, which entails sometimes cumbersome 
administrative procedures (for example, the property of an ox has to be certified with a 
document stamped by the municipality). With the GCV, the ceiling is set up to 8000 euros, 
nd the disbursement takes place immediately after storage. 
ntrast, the Cecam was acknowledged as a very serious and reliable structure 
 engage with. 
 5 month interest are due, irrespective of whether the repayment takes 
lace ahead of time. 
ft bad memories among the members who had been hit, as the following example illustrates:  
 
y the 
time of the interview, he had not run into this kind of problems anymore. 
his can entail problematic delays all the more so if there is some shortage of lending 
nds. 
a
 
Qualitative data confirm the high rate of approval of the GCV among the users, and give some 
additional insights. Particularly relevant is the level of trust that the borrowers have in the 
storage system. Stakes are very high since it is their rice stock and it cannot be removed for 
the duration of the loan. Several people compared with other inventory credit experiences that 
they had heard about or experienced themselves (run by NGOs, other MFIs, the church etc.) : 
stories of stock losses, thefts or more simply lack of rigour in the warehouse management 
abounded. By co
to
 
If we turn to criticisms, the most salient complaint was about the interest rate (cited by 51% of 
respondents). Although it is a recurrent criticism in microfinance users assessments, and 
somehow it is “part of the bargaining game” between the clients and their institutions, it can 
provide information in terms of comparison with the local competing institutions. More 
specifically, some members expressed that some institutions are offering a lower interest 
(examples include 2% and 2,5%, compared to 3% for the Cecam). They also referred to the 
fact that a minimum
p
 
The criticism about delays in credit instalment (cited by 20% of respondents) is mostly linked 
with the fact that the Cecam network went through several years of refinancing shortage due 
to a fast expansion phase. Although this problem was eventually solved after 2006 because 
the CECAM was able to strike a deal at the national level with the formal banking system, it 
le
During the qualitative interviews, one member told us that in 1999 the credit 
instalment was delayed two months whereas his rice was already stored and 
could not be unstored. The member had planned to use the money to trade rice 
and to buy a piece of land. Because of the delay, he had to buy the rice at a 
higher price and he lost the opportunity to buy the plot because someone else 
was able to pay cash and got the deal. After that, he stopped doing GCV during 
6 years because he did not trust the Cecam branch anymore. He went back 
afterwards when he saw that the problems seemed to have been solved. B
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that in some branches there is a risk of crowding out of 
small rice storers for the benefit of large storers who can be producers as well as traders. This 
has to do also with the incentive system for credit officers, which is mostly expressed in terms 
of loan volume rather than in loan numbers. For a credit officer, it is therefore rational to first 
serve the large rice storers, in order to reach their operational objectives, and then the smaller 
ones. T
fu
 
For 14% of the respondents, the computing factor was deemed too low, which expresses a 
restriction on the loan amount compared to what they would have desired. Qualitative 
interviews allowed us to go a little deeper into how members perceive and understand the 
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computing factor system. Although some consider that it definitely should be closer to the 
actual market price at the time of harvest, most people (and particularly among the poor and 
the medium wealth categories) understand it as a tradeoff between access to a certain loan 
amount and a risk-reducing device with regards to possible and unexpectable failures in price 
differentials, which would put some pressure on their capacity to take benefit out of the loan.  
 
o have a lower quantum because then it will be easier to repay the 
an”. 
h a credit that she is not sure to be 
ble to repay easily at the beginning of the lean season6 : 
 
 “with a lower quantum I get a lower credit which will be easier to repay” 
on the savings than on the credit features of this financial product (more on this in 
ection 5).  
d have more investment capacity and can make 
plans to build additional storage facilities. 
4. Price differentials and food security 
ntials are sizeable and evenly distributed across wealth 
shows an average difference of 44%. If we consider an average length of 6 months, this 
                                                
“If the rice prices do not evolve as usual, like in 2005 for example, then it is 
better t
lo
 
During the qualitative interviews, one woman even expressed that she would like the quantum 
to be lower, so that she would not take so much risk wit
a
 
This is an extreme case, but illustrative of one of the rationales behind the GCV, which is 
based more 
s
 
Finally, the qualitative interviews allowed us to identify a major restriction for GCV 
expansion that had gone unnoticed with the quantitative questionnaire. Expansion of 
individual GCV volumes are often constrained by the lack of warehouse facilities that comply 
with the requirement set up by the Cecam (17 cases out of 41, that is 41%). This is 
particularly the case in one of the regions under study, where traditional buildings are made of 
rush, not of brick as it is generally the case in the central highlands. In two cases, people told 
us that they had built a brick house for their family, and that they had moved back into their 
old rush house in order to leave the brick building for the rice storage. This indirect access 
constraint to the GCV is more likely to affect the medium households that are on an rising 
economic trajectory and who would like to increase the volumes stored (10 cases were 
reported, which represent half of the sample medium households). For poor households, the 
quantity that they are able to set aside is generally the prime limiting factor (no poor 
household declared that they were warehouse constrained). On the other hand, nonpoor 
households that are warehouse constraine
Price differe
categories 
Table 9 displays descriptive statistics for the price differences between the time of storage and 
unstorage. These differences were recorded for 188 GCV between 2003 and 2007. The second 
section of the table, where the price difference is expressed in percentage of the initial price, 
 
6 Apparently this claim was expressed in a number of quantitative questionnaires as well. 
Unfortunately, it was not singled out as a specific criticism during the coding phase and was 
integrated into the aggregated “other” category. This anecdote illustrates (although too late in 
this case) the importance of iterative back and forth moves between the quantitative and the 
qualitative in order to foster the relevance of the quantitative data. 
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simple result illustrates quite an impressive benefit from the marketing side alone. This makes 
the GCV an outstanding product from a savings perspective. 
 
On the equity ground, Table 9 indicates that these benefits accrue evenly to all categories of 
households : the means and percentile distributions do not exhibit distinctive patterns. 
 
Table 9 : Price difference in GCV 
 N GCV Average Standard 
deviation 
Min 25th 
centile 
50th 
centile 
75th 
centile 
Max 
Price difference in € /T         
Non poor 42 68,8 46,8 0 40 62 95,6 236 
Medium 79 60 37,2 -70 40 64 80 140 
Poor 67 68 78,4 -28 40 68 92 160 
Total 188 65,2 40 -70 40 64 92 236 
Price difference in % of 
initial price 
        
Non poor 42 45% 33% 0% 24% 39% 63% 169% 
Medium 79 40% 25% -20% 20% 43% 56% 100% 
Poor 67 49% 32% -10% 25% 49% 67% 140% 
Total 188 44% 29% -20% 25% 43% 60% 169% 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey 
 
 
Obviously, local prices are not insulated from external shocks that can hit the local markets, 
such as massive imports, or unexpected disruptions (see Box 2). However, in our sample, only 
four cases came out with a negative outcome, 3 of them in 2005 which was an unusual, quite 
erratic year in terms of price trends. As Chart 1 illustrates, the GCV currently appears to bear 
a very low level of risk in terms of price differential. 
 
Box 2 :  
In one of the regions under study, an industrial rice compound was set up in 2005 (allegedly 
on the initiative of the president family). This compound temporarily disrupted the local 
market by crowding out the traditional traders out of aggressive marketing practices and 
setting up an artificial monopoly situation. This resulted in the price differential for year 2005 
being almost null at the time when it usually reaches a peak. GCV borrowers who had waited 
until that time and could not wait any longer (or were concerned that the price would go 
further down) thus could realize hardly no gain on this level. However, the year after, the 
differential came back.  
 
Alaotra region 
Year  minimum price  maximum price  computing factor 
2003  250   300   150 
2004  400   900   200 
2005  450   500   300 
2006  280   800   300 
2007  480   na   400 
Source : Cecam regional office 
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Chart 1 : price differentials (in % of initial price) – GCV 2003 -2007 
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Building market knowledge and marketing strategies 
During in-depth interviews, many interviewees expressed that they are now paying more 
attention to the local variations of the paddy market, the identity and practices of the local 
traders, and that they build a strategy of storage and unstorage on the basis of this 
information. This can be interpreted as a spillover benefit of the GCV in terms of capacity 
building and economic empowerment. 
 
Two members who had been taking GCV for several years told us that they were now 
scheduling the unstorage of their rice stock once the price reached a pre-set threshold 
that they considered allowed them to win enough from the price differential side. As 
one of them put it, “the price might still go up afterwards, but there was some years 
when it went down, so this way, I am sure I get some benefit.” Several other members 
also mentioned a threshold strategy, but they were setting the threshold at a very high 
level which they themselves admitted had a low probability to happen. 
 
On the other hand, a couple told us that they were trying to wait as long as possible 
(until January or February) to unstore their rice. They told us that usually there is a 
peak of GCV repayment in November and December because people need to sell the 
rice to pay for the next rice cycle. Local rice traders are now aware of that, and they 
can make arrangements among themselves to bring the prices down even though the 
trends are going upwards. By waiting long enough, the couple considered they could 
escape this and make the most benefit out of the price differential. 
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Food security 
We built an indicator of food insecurity by combining two variables of the panel survey for 
2006 and 2007 : 1. to have bought rice for family consumption7 during the year preceding the 
survey, and 2. to have had trouble in financing the purchases of rice. Table 10 shows how 
food insecurity is distributed across household wealth categories (for all households in the 
survey). In total, 54% of households buy rice to meet their family consumption needs, and out 
of the purchasers, 27% run into trouble to finance their purchases. In sum, almost one 
household out of 7 (15%) can therefore be considered as food insecure according to our 
definition. As expected, this rate is almost null for nonpoor households, and raises to 23 % for 
poor households. Although quite rough, our indicator thus appears to be reasonably robust. 
 
Table 10 : household food insecurity in 2007, by wealth categories 
 N 
Rice purchase for 
family 
consumptiona 
HH found it 
difficult to finance 
rice purchaseb Food insecuritya 
Total households (members and 
non members)     
Non poor 97 45% 7% 3% 
Medium 140 49% 28% 14% 
Poor  136 64% 36% 23% 
Total 373 54% 27% 15% 
Cecam members using GCV in 
2006     
Non poor 22 32% 0% 0% 
Medium 38 37% 14% 5% 
Poor  26 73% 21% 15% 
Total 86 47% 15% 7% 
a : % out of total number of household for each wealth category. b : % out of the number of households that proceeded to rice 
purchases.  
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey 
 
We used this indicator to inquire into the food security status for households that had had a 
GCV the year before, and particularly the poor households. According to Table 10, while the 
rate of food insecurity in 2007 is 23% for all poor household (members and non members), it 
is only 15% for poor households who had a GCV with CECAM the year before (figures for 
year 2006 are 23% and 18% respectively – table not shown). On average, then, there appears 
to be a positive link between having access to a GCV and being in a better situation in terms 
of food security.  
Households who buy rice during the GCV period 
We thought at the beginning that the practice of buying rice during the GCV might indicate 
food pressure on poorer households that would have stored too much of their production (see 
Table 6). But the panel survey data show that all categories of households are involved, and 
that their purchases are made globally at the same prices (Table 11). The data thus do not 
allow to conclude that richer households buy at the beginning of the GCV to benefit from low 
prices while poorer household would buy at the end because they are running out of stock at 
home, and would do so at higher a price. 
 
                                                 
7 Purchases for other purposes (marketing, catering etc.), which accounted for 7% of the 
responses, were removed from the analyses. 
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Table 11 : rice purchases during GCV period  
 Total N % of households who 
bought rice during 
GCV 
Price of rice bought 
   25th centile 50th centile 75th centile 
Non poor 51 39% 373 440 575 
Medium 96 34% 380 420 510 
Poor 75 45% 358 450 580 
Total 222 39% 380 430 580 
Source : Cecam impact study panel survey. Khi2 test non significant. 
 
Qualitative data indicate that all categories of households can exhibit quite complex patterns 
of staggered purchases, sales and storage phases, which aggregate data at the survey level 
cannot capture (and which in-depth qualitative interview can capture only partially). We were 
able to identify several intertwined strategies related to the purchase of rice during GCV. The 
first one is related to rice for family consumption. Around 2/3 of the 41 households kept a 
stock of rice at home aside from the GCV. The rationale put forward was twofold : one was to 
keep as much rice as possible for family self-consumption until the lean season, the other was 
to keep some stock as a form of liquid savings that could be used in case of emergency, thus 
providing flexibility and resilience. On the opposite, one third of households had stored all 
their production in a GCV and were buying the rice for family consumption, taking advantage 
of the low prices during the first months of the storage period. Intermediary situations were 
also observed, where purchased rice (at a low price) was stored in the GCV for future family 
consumption (10 cases, 25%). All three categories of wealth were represented in the different 
sections of the spectrum. 
 
The second strategy underlying the purchase of rice during the GCV period is related to the 
economic activity of rice trading, as part of the diversification of the household activity 
portfolio. The GCV then can provide both a source of cash flow and a storage facility for part 
of the collected rice. Twelve households (29%) reported doing rice trading linked with the 
GCV. This strategy appeared to be associated mostly with non poor and medium households 
(there was only one poor household out of the 12). 
5. Rationales and limits  
Because it combines hybrid features of a commercialisation and a financial service, the GCV 
can serve different purposes, separately or more often in combination, alternatively or 
simultaneously. These include food security, but also cash-flow for productive activities or 
more generally household livelihood, and asset building. The following section is an attempt 
to present a stylized typology of how these different purposes are articulated within the three 
wealth categories of households, and the constraints that are associated. 
Poor households: forceful savings for food security 
For the poor households, the main rationale of the GCV is associated to forceful savings in 
order to smooth consumption and avoid too much pressure on the household food security 
status at the lean season.  
 
“If there is no GCV, it is too hard to keep the stock of rice at home. There are too 
many temptations to sell little by little.”  
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The GCV credit can be used to repay the previous productive loan and to pay for small 
expenses (including rice for family consumption), but there are few cases of uses for starting 
or developing off-season activities (this can be due to the limited amount of the credit but also 
to a series of other barriers to diversification).  
 
Even if it works on average, the strategy might prove complicated for some households, 
particularly the most vulnerable ones. First, if pushed beyond a certain limit, forceful savings 
can mean transferring the lean season to the storage period.  
 
One widow with 7 children told us that she deliberately kept no rice at home in order 
to save as much as possible for the lean season. But this translated into her self-
constraining the family food consumption during the period of the GCV. Moreover, 
with no stock at home, she could not face some unexpected expenses that arose. Thus 
she had to unstore part of her GCV ahead of time, which prevented her to reap all the 
benefits associated with the price differential. 
 
Reimbursement of the GCV can also sometimes prove difficult. Data from both quantitative 
and qualitative surveys indicate that poor household tend to rely more on agricultural sources 
of income, and particularly on rainy season rice production, because of an array of barriers to 
productive diversification. For those households, paying back the GCV in the last trimester 
can prove difficult. A commonly reported practice is then to make an arrangement with a 
local trader to sell in advance the stock of rice. Those sales in advance can be conceptualized 
of as an informal loan8, and some estimates of the implicit interest rate indicate that they can 
reach very high levels for a very short duration (often one day or two). 
 
Two people told us that the difference could be around 20 ar/kg. In the best case 
scenario, where the local price is highest, say 800 ar/kg, this makes for an implicit 
interest rate of 2,5%, often for a duration of only 1 to 2 days. One person 
mentioned that in her case, the difference had been as high as 100 ar/kg. 
 
Finally, poor households can cumulate credits from Cecam and other informal sources. 
According to the Cecam, accessing a productive credit allows to engage in rice cultivation 
without having to get a loan on the informal market in exchange for the advance sale of the 
rice production. However, the Cecam loan amounts might be constrained by the level of 
material collateral, and some households thus still complement the Cecam productive credit 
with some informal credit arrangement. In at least three cases, people were juggling with 
successive credits, using the most recent ones to repay the previous ones, and were on the 
verge of overindebtedness. 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, this kind of practice was identified only during the in-depth qualitative 
interviews. A possible reason might lie in the wording of the quantitative questionnaire : it 
was asked whether the interviewee had taken another loan to repay for the GCV. For the 
people, selling in advance is not equivalent to taking a loan, which might have induced an 
over rate of negative responses. Another reason might have been the reluctance to admit this 
kind of practice which might be negatively qualified by the Cecam staff (although the 
interviews were kept confidential). Qualitative interviews are more suited to create an 
appropriate dialogue setting, inducing people to talk more openly about sensitive issues. 
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Medium households: forceful savings, food security and economic 
diversification 
For medium households, the forceful savings dimension of the GCV is also highly valued, 
although for a somewhat different reason than the poor households. Several households 
expressed that if the stock was kept at home, it was sold little by little and no relevant expense 
could be made out of it. This statement illustrates the importance of one-shot bulk amounts of 
money for investment strategies, which are not equivalent to several times a fraction of the 
same amount (Rutherford 1999).  
 
“What makes the GCV interesting is that one can wait until the price reaches a peak, 
and also that one can sell all at once rather than little by little. It is more interesting to 
have a lump sum at once, there is less risk to spoil it with irrelevant expenses than if 
we have several times smaller amounts.”  
 
As for the credit part of the GCV, the funds can be used both for ensuring the household food 
security and for improving the economic portfolio, including off-season agricultural activities, 
small livestock, nonfarm activities such as rice trading and milling, grocery stores, etc. Part of 
the GCV can also be used to strengthen the asset base, through purchases of oxen, small 
equipment, and land plots.  
 
Although there are also cases of advance sales to rice traders to repay for the GCV, medium 
households generally can take advantage of their more diversified economic portfolio to plan 
for off-season incomes which will be used to repay the loan.  Medium households can also 
cumulate credits from Cecam and other informal sources (particularly to finance the rice 
production), but are less exposed to the risk of over indebtedness than the poor. For the 
medium households, the main limit to the expansion of the GCV strategies often lies in the 
storage capacity. 
Non poor households : forceful savings, high amounts of credit, 
and leveraging for economic diversification and expansion 
For nonpoor households, the meaning of forceful savings is the same as for the medium 
households. The issue of food security is not relevant any more for this category of 
households, and both the savings and the credit dimensions of the GCV can be used as an 
important leverage for expanding their economic activities and their asset base. 
 
Nonpoor household have the financial capacity to repay the GCV without selling their stock 
in advance and thus are able to reap the full benefits of the GCV in terms of price differential. 
They can combine Cecam credit with other credits, generally from formal sources such as 
commercial banks, with little risk of over indebtedness. Like the medium households, they 
can face constraints in terms of storage capacities, but unlike the medium households, they 
have more capacity to invest in warehouse building. 
6. Conclusions and operational implications 
Evidence confirms the central role of the GCV among the Cecam members, across all wealth 
categories. The GCV is prominent in most credit trajectories and appears as the most popular 
credit product according to all categories of Cecam members. The flexibility in terms of 
collateral requirement, the lightness in the filing procedure, and the rigorous monitoring of the 
warehouses are particularly appreciated.  
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Differentiated households translate into differentiated strategies around a same financial 
product. This is all the more so that inventory credit is by itself a hybrid of marketing and 
financial service, and, as a financial service, can serve functions of credit and/or savings. 
 
Quantitative evidence show that on average, the GCV is beneficial for all categories of 
members in terms of price differential. For poor households, this means mostly a gain in terms 
of food security, the GCV being used as a forceful savings device which allow them to 
economize on their global food expenses over the year. For richer households, this means 
better conditions of access to the rice market, thus fostering their monetary agricultural 
income which can be injected to their economic portfolio. For all households, the credit tied to 
the rice stored allows for additional cash flow which can be used to smooth consumption 
(including food purchase, but also social and schooling expenses), to engage in off-season 
productive activities, and even to invest in assets. While poor households mostly use the 
credit as a consumption smoothing device, non poor households, including, but not limited to, 
large rice producers, are able to take advantage of the leverage effect of the GCV to 
significantly foster their economic portfolio (including rice marketing) and make some 
productive investments. 
 
There can be some drawbacks, though. First, as the GCV is very much appreciated by the non 
poor household, and the amount ceiling is much higher than for other Cecam credit products, 
there is a risk of big storers crowding out the smaller ones, particularly if financial resources 
are limited at the branch level. For the sake of equity, attention should be given to the credit 
officers incentive system in order to reward not only the aggregate amount of loan portfolio 
but also the number of loans. 
 
Second, even though poor households value the GCV as a means to forcefully save rice for 
family consumption until the lean season, some of the most vulnerable might paradoxically 
find themselves under food pressure during the time of the loan. For the most vulnerable 
households, other, more focused food security instruments or programs than the GCV alone 
need to be called for. Also, poor households that are highly dependent on agricultural income, 
and unable to engage into remunerative off-season activities, may have a hard time 
reimbursing the GCV. They then turn to informal lenders or they sell in advance the rice 
stored in the GCV to a local marketers. This provides flexibility to the system, but at the cost 
of stripping part of the benefits of the GCV. Some members even suggested that taking up a 
credit in exchange for the rice storage should be optional, emphasizing the value given to the 
savings side of this financial product.  
 
One last aspect has to do with the prospects of scaling up this kind of product. Currently, the 
main constraint for further scaling up of the GCV within the Cecam network is the lack of 
appropriate warehouse facilities. On the other hand, one of the most attractive feature of the 
GCV – the cyclical fluctuations that generate a seasonal price differential on the local market 
– is conditional upon the fact that the GCV system is not being expanded beyond a certain 
level. Massification could well put an end to the price benefits of the system. For 
policymakers and developers, the promises of the inventory credit might then be locked in a 
tricky dilemma. 
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